Brooks v. Starr Commonwealth, et al.

This case deals with the liability of a private juvenile delinquent placement.  The basic facts are as follows: A juvenile delinquent was placed in Starr Commonwealth by Bridgeway Services.  The juvenile escaped and Starr did not notify law enforcement for 100 minutes although bed checks were done every 15 minutes.  MCL 803.306a requires a facility in which a juvenile delinquent is placed to immediately notify law enforcement.

Upon his escape, the juvenile stole a vehicle and caused an accidental death. The estate of the decedent initiated a wrongful death action against Starr and Bridgeway,  Trial court granted Starr’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case.  COA reversed and held it was a jury issue whether Starr’s late notification made Starr liable.

Plaintiff brought a common law negligence action against Starr and Bridgeway based on the Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 319. Under a common law tort action, the plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71-72; 701 NW2d 684 (2005). [Remember duty, breach, causation and damages from law school?] The Court of Appeals held that the common law tort action was properly dismissed in light of the fact that there is no general duty to prevent the criminal acts of third parties. Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 553-554; 739 NW2d 313 (2007).

Plaintiff also brought a statutory negligence claim based a violation of MCL 803.306a, that provides:

(1) If a public ward described in subjection (2) escapes from a facility or residence in which he or she has been placed, other than his or her own home or the home of his or her parent or guardian, the individual at that facility or residence responsible for maintaining custody of the public ward at the time of the escape shall immediately notify 1 of the following of the escape or cause 1 of the following to be immediately notified of the escape:

(a) If the escape occurs in a city, village, or township that has a police department, that police department.

(b) If subdivision (a) does not apply, 1 of the following:

(i) The sheriff department of the county in which the escape occurs.

(ii) The department of state police post having jurisdiction over the area in which the escape occurs.

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(3) A police agency that receives notification of an escape under subsection (1) shall enter that notification into the law enforcement information network without undue delay.

(4) As used in this section, “escape” means to leave without lawful authority or to fail to return to custody when required.

The use of a statutory violation to establish negligence is a matter of judicial discretion, and evidence of a violation of a penal statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence.  Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78, 86-87; 393 NW2d 356 (1986). The same rules apply when a party is alleged to have violated a safety statute. Id. That is, the trial court must examine the statute to determine if it was intended to protect against the result of the violation, if the plaintiff was within the class intended to be protected, and if the evidence would support a finding that the violation was a proximate contributing cause of the event. Id. at 87.

The mere fact that a defendant’s conduct may have violated a statute does not demonstrate that a plaintiff owed a duty of care. Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc, 235 Mich App 1, 16; 596 NW2d 620 (1999).  Rather, once a duty is found, the violation of the statute may demonstrate prima facie evidence of negligence. Thus, the plaintiff’s use of a statute to impose a duty of care upon the defendant is contingent upon the statute’s purpose and the class of persons it was designed to protect. Id.

Once evidence of a statutory violation is presented, this presumption of negligence may be rebutted by evidence of a legally sufficient excuse for the statutory violation. Klanseck, supra at 86. In the absence of evidence to support such an excuse, the jury may infer negligence on the basis of the violation. Id. “It is then for the jury to determine whether violation of the statute was a proximate cause.” Id.

The Court of Appeals found that the juvenile had a history of repeated escapes from the Starr facility and a history of assaultive behavior.  Prior to his adjudication, he was involved in gang activity.  Despite this history, Starr housed the juvenile in an unlocked cottage.  Starr violated the statute’s requirement that they immediately report an escape to law enforcement by not reporting the escape for 100 minutes, despite 15 minute bed checks.   The immediacy requirement was designed to prevent harm to the public from an escaped juvenile and plaintiff was within the class of people the statute was enacted to protect.  Thus, there existed a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of Starr, which should have been heard by the jury.

Bridgeway has a contract with Wayne County for the “clinical treatment and risk management” of adjudicated juveniles under the county’s supervision. Starr and Bridgeway have a contract under which Starr agrees to accept offenders assigned by Bridgeway for participation in its program, which is a program in compliance with the Bridgeway-Wayne County contract.  Bridgeway sought indemnification from Starr, based on an indemnification provision in the contract between Starr and Bridgeway.  Plaintiff alleged that Bridgeway owed a duty separate from Starr and breached that duty.  The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claims involved active negligence and were independent from those alleged against Starr and that the indemnification provision did not cover acts of Bridgeway’s own negligence.  Bridgeway was required to defend against these claims regardless of Starr’s liability.

Ultimately, a case like this is going to increase the costs of housing juvenile defenders because it has increased the liability and costs to the placement and treatment providers.

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